

**EXHIBIT 8**  
**Part 1 of 2**

**B197875**

MC-275

Name Santiago Montenegro  
 Address P.O. Box 705/ND-12-L  
CTF North Facility  
Soledad, CA. 93960-0705  
 CDC or ID Number H-55090

COURT OF APPEAL-SECOND DIST.

**FILED**

APR - 2 2007

JOSEPH A. LANE Clerk  
VICTOR I. SALAS Deputy Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL  
 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT  
 (Court)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

**B197875**

Santiago Montenegro
Petitioner
vs.
Ben Curry: et., al;
Respondent

No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 (To be supplied by the Clerk of the Court)

INSTRUCTIONS—READ CAREFULLY

- If you are challenging an order of commitment or a criminal conviction and are filing this petition in the Superior Court, you should file it in the county that made the order.
- If you are challenging the conditions of your confinement and are filing this petition in the Superior Court, you should file it in the county in which you are confined.
- Read the entire form *before* answering any questions.
- This petition must be clearly handwritten in ink or typed. You should exercise care to make sure all answers are true and correct. Because the petition includes a verification, the making of a statement that you know is false may result in a conviction for perjury.
- Answer all applicable questions in the proper spaces. If you need additional space, add an extra page and indicate that your answer is "continued on additional page."
- If you are filing this petition in the Superior Court, you need file only the original unless local rules require additional copies. Many courts require more copies.
- If you are filing this petition in the Court of Appeal, file the original and four copies of the petition and, if separately bound, one copy of any supporting documents.
- If you are filing this petition in the California Supreme Court, file the original and ten copies of the petition and, if separately bound, two copies of any supporting documents.
- Notify the Clerk of the Court in writing if you change your address after filing your petition.
- In most cases, the law requires service of a copy of the petition on the district attorney, city attorney, or city prosecutor. See Penal Code section 1475 and Government Code section 72193. You may serve the copy by mail.

Approved by the Judicial Council of California for use under Rule 60 of the California Rules of Court [as amended effective January 1, 2005]. Subsequent amendments to Rule 60 may change the number of copies to be furnished to the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal.

Page one of six

## This petition concerns:

☐ A conviction☒ Parole☐ A sentence☐ Credits☐ Jail or prison conditions☐ Prison discipline☐ Other (specify): \_\_\_\_\_1. Your name: Santiago Montiano2. Where are you incarcerated? Correctional Training Facility, Soledad, California3. Why are you in custody? ☒ Criminal Conviction ☐ Civil Commitment

Answer subdivisions a. through i. to the best of your ability.

a. State reason for civil commitment or, if criminal conviction, state nature of offense and enhancements (for example, "robbery with use of a deadly weapon").

Second degree murder / With use of a handgunb. Penal or other code sections: Penal Code 187 (a) / Penal Code 12022.5c. Name and location of sentencing or committing court: Santa Barbara Superior Court P.O. Box 21107 Santa Barbara, CA. 93101d. Case number: SM073867e. Date convicted or committed: October 30, 1992f. Date sentenced: October 30, 1992g. Length of sentence: 15 years to lifeh. When do you expect to be released? Unknowni. Were you represented by counsel in the trial court? ☒ Yes. ☐ No. If yes, state the attorney's name and address:David Ogren Public Defender County of Santa Barbara 3rd FL Santa Barbara, CA. 93101

4. What was the LAST plea you entered? (check one)

☒ Not guilty ☐ Guilty ☐ Nolo Contendere ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

5. If you pleaded not guilty, what kind of trial did you have?

☒ Jury ☐ Judge without a jury ☐ Submitted on transcript ☐ Awaiting trial

6. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

**Ground 1:** State briefly the ground on which you base your claim for relief. For example, "the trial court imposed an illegal enhancement." *(If you have additional grounds for relief, use a separate page for each ground. State ground 2 on page four. For additional grounds, make copies of page four and number the additional grounds in order.)*

SEE ATTACHED PETITION

a. Supporting facts:

Tell your story briefly without citing cases or law. If you are challenging the legality of your conviction, describe the facts upon which your conviction is based. *If necessary, attach additional pages.* CAUTION: You must state facts, not conclusions. For example, if you are claiming incompetence of counsel you must state facts specifically setting forth what your attorney did or failed to do and how that affected your trial. Failure to allege sufficient facts will result in the denial of your petition. (See *In re Swain* (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304.) A rule of thumb to follow is: *who did exactly what to violate your rights at what time (when) or place (where).* *(If available, attach declarations, relevant records, transcripts, or other documents supporting your claim.)*

SEE ATTACHED PETITION

b. Supporting cases, rules, or other authority (optional):

*(Briefly discuss, or list by name and citation, the cases or other authorities that you think are relevant to your claim. If necessary, attach an extra page.)*

SEE ATTACHED PETITION

7. Ground 2 or Ground \_\_\_\_\_ (if applicable):

SEE ATTACHED PETITION

a. Supporting facts:

SEE ATTACHED PETITION

b. Supporting cases, rules, or other authority:

SEE ATTACHED PETITION

8. Did you appeal from the conviction, sentence, or commitment? ☒ Yes. ☐ No. If yes, give the following information:

a. Name of court ("Court of Appeal" or "Appellate Dept. of Superior Court"):

Second Appellate District, Division Six

b. Result: JUDgment Affirmed

c. Date of decision: May 28, 1993

d. Case number or citation of opinion, if known: B072387

e. Issues raised: (1) Counsel filed a statement pursuant to People v. Wende

(2) No issues were raised

(3) \_\_\_\_\_

f. Were you represented by counsel on appeal? ☒ Yes. ☐ No. If yes, state the attorney's name and address, if known:

Gilbert W. Lentz 1114 State Street, Suite 240 Santa Barbara, CA. 93101

9. Did you seek review in the California Supreme Court? ☐ Yes. ☒ No. If yes, give the following information:

a. Result: \_\_\_\_\_

b. Date of decision: \_\_\_\_\_

c. Case number or citation of opinion, if known: \_\_\_\_\_

d. Issues raised: (1) \_\_\_\_\_

(2) \_\_\_\_\_

(3) \_\_\_\_\_

10. If your petition makes a claim regarding your conviction, sentence, or commitment that you or your attorney did not make on appeal, explain why the claim was not made on appeal:

11. Administrative Review:

a. If your petition concerns conditions of confinement or other claims for which there are administrative remedies, failure to exhaust administrative remedies may result in the denial of your petition, even if it is otherwise meritorious. (See *In re Muszalski* (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 500 [125 Cal.Rptr. 286].) Explain what administrative review you sought or explain why you did not seek such review:

N/A

b. Did you seek the highest level of administrative review available? ☐ Yes. ☒ No.

Attach documents that show you have exhausted your administrative remedies.

12. Other than direct appeal, have you filed any other petitions, applications, or motions with respect to this conviction, commitment, or issue in any court? ☐ Yes. If yes, continue with number 13. ☒ No. If no, skip to number 15.

13. a. (1) Name of court: \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Nature of proceeding (for example, "habeas corpus petition"): \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Issues raised: (a) \_\_\_\_\_

(b) \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Result (Attach order or explain why unavailable): \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Date of decision: \_\_\_\_\_

b. (1) Name of court: \_\_\_\_\_

(2) Nature of proceeding: \_\_\_\_\_

(3) Issues raised: (a) \_\_\_\_\_

(b) \_\_\_\_\_

(4) Result (Attach order or explain why unavailable): \_\_\_\_\_

(5) Date of decision: \_\_\_\_\_

c. For additional prior petitions, applications, or motions, provide the same information on a separate page.

14. If any of the courts listed in number 13 held a hearing, state name of court, date of hearing, nature of hearing, and result:

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

15. Explain any delay in the discovery of the claimed grounds for relief and in raising the claims in this petition. (See *In re Swain* (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304.)

No Delays

16. Are you presently represented by counsel? ☐ Yes. ☐ No. If yes, state the attorney's name and address, if known:

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

17. Do you have any petition, appeal, or other matter pending in any court? ☐ Yes. ☐ No. If yes, explain:

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

18. If this petition might lawfully have been made to a lower court, state the circumstances justifying an application to this court:

This Court has original jurisdiction

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

I, the undersigned, say: I am the petitioner in this action. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing allegations and statements are true and correct, except as to matters that are stated on my information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Date:

3-23-07

(SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER)

1 Santiago Montenegro  
2 P.O. Box 705/ND-12-L  
3 CTF North Facility  
4 Soledad, CA. 93960-0705

5  
6  
7  
8 In Propria Persona

9  
10  
11 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
12  
13 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

14 IN RE: SANTIAGO MONTENEGRO

CASE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

15  
16  
17  
18 PETITIONER

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS  
CORPUS AND MEMORANDUM OF  
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN  
SUPPORT THEREOF.

19 ON HABEAS CORPUS

20  
21  
22 ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY

23 TO: THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND  
24 APPELLATE DISTRICT AND THE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE.

25 Santiago Montenegro, (hereafter petitioner) In Propria, Persona  
26 hereby petitions this Honorable Court for Writ Of Habeas Corpus foll-  
27 owing the decision of the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County.  
28

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1 Santiago Montenegro, H-55090  
2 P.O. Box 705/ND- 12-L  
3 CTF North Facility  
4 Soledad, CA. 93960-0705  
5  
6  
7

8 In Propria Persona  
9  
10

11 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

12 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT  
13

14 IN RE: SANTIAGO MONTENEGRO

CASE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

15 PETITIONER  
16

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS  
CORPUS AND MEMORANDUM OF  
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN  
SUPPORT THEREOF.

17 ON HABEAS CORPUS  
18 \_\_\_\_\_/

19 1.

20 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS  
21

22 TO: THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND  
23 APPELLATE DISTRICT AND TO THE HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE.

24 Comes Now Santiago Montenegro (hereafter petitioner) In Propria  
25 Persona. Petitioner is unlawfully restrained of his liberty. This  
26 petition is intended to give meaning to Santiago Montenegro's sentence  
27 of 15 years to life for second degree murder - by seeking to overturn  
28 the Board of Parole Hearings "Illegal And Unconstitutional" decision  
refusing to grant him parole for the (2nd) time since becoming elig-  
ible for parole on January 4, 2003.

1 Under the parole statute (penal code section 3041, amended 1976, c.  
2 1139), parole is now the norm rather than the exception. (penal code  
3 section 3041 (a), the board "shall" normally set a parole release date  
4 at the initial hearing". A life prisoner must have a release date set  
5 when his release would not pose a danger to the public. (penal code  
6 section 3041 (b). That determination must be based on criteria set  
7 forth in the Penal Code. The Board is given latitude to formulate  
8 criteria implementing the statutory mandate. (Penal Code Section  
9 5076.2). However, this criteria is limited to the parameters estab-  
10 lished by statute and legislative intent. (Terhune v. Superior Court,  
11 65 cal. App. 4th 864, 872-873 (1998).

12 In the case of this petitioner, there is "No Evidence" in the  
13 record to support the Board's denial of parole at his (2nd) parole  
14 hearing. The court is asked to issue a formal "Order To Show Cause"  
15 and require the respondent to present to the court justification for  
16 the Board's decision in this case. The court is asked to find the  
17 decision violated due process of law and order the Board to set  
18 this petitioner's parole release date. The court is also asked to  
19 declare the rights of the parties under the Due Process and Equal  
20 Protection Clauses, in regards to the Board's interpretation of  
21 Section 3041, Penal Code, and to issue habeas relief accordingly.

22 Generally, Petitioner asserts that he is being subjected to an  
23 unconstitutional condition in the determination of his parole appli-  
24 cations because the Board of Parole Hearings has been operating out-  
25 side the law pursuant to a policy against granting paroles, such that  
26 the parole statute has been and currently is misinterpreted to the  
27 extent that petitioner has been deprived all substantive due process  
28 protections of the law including his federally protected liberty in-

terest to parole. Petitioner asserts, within this context, that the Board has been found to be operating pursuant to a "No" parole policy which reduces parole hearings to pro forma sham hearings where parole commissioners are precluded by this policy (and their own abiding animus) from being fair or impartial, which violates substantive due process of law.

11.

#### PARTIES

PETITIONER, SANTIAGO MONTENEGRO, CDC#H-55090 is a prisoner of the State of California, incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility Soledad, California.

RESPONDENT, BEN CURRY, is the Warden of the Correctional Training Facility Soledad, California and is the legal custodian of the petitioner

111.

#### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Preliminary formalities (HT 1). 1/ (Exhibit 1, transcript of parole hearing conducted on August 16, 2006).

Santiago Montenegro (hereafter petitioner) was recieved by the California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitations (CDCR) 11/06/92 from Santa Barbara County for the offense of murder 2nd with use of a firearm. He is sentenced to an indeterminate term of 17 years to life. Case number SM073867. His Minimum Eligible Parole Date (MEPD) is set for February 3, 2003.

1. References to the parole hearing transcripts will be indicated by HT followed by page number, i.e, (HT 0).

COMMITMENT OFFENSE

The following are statements taken from the petitioner's probation officer report dated October 21, 1992. (See Exhibit 2 at p.2-3).

On November 13, 1985, Santa Maria Police Officers responded to El Conquistador Bar, 210 S. Blosser, Santa Maria, to investigate a shooting. Officers found Antonio Hernandez Cardona, age 22, slumped in the right front passenger seat of an automobile. Officers observed a gun shot wound in the front of his neck, an ambulance was called and he was taken to Marian Medical Center where he died at 2315 hours. Doctors concluded the victim died as a result of a gun shot wound to the anterior neck/chest, exiting through the back. A second entry wound in the left shoulder revealed a .44 caliber bullet. The victim was shot three times.

Investigation revealed the victim was the alleged boyfriend of Liliana Beltran, and they had been inside the El Conquistador Bar. Ms. Beltran left the bar and went outside to the victim's car. The defendant followed Ms. Beltran out to the car, sat down in the car and tried to kiss her. The victim came out of the bar with two friends, saw what was going on and pulled the defendant out of the car. The victim and defendant verbally argued, the defendant pulled a .44 magnum pistol from his waistband, and fired three or four shots, killing the victim. The defendant fled the area.

The defendant told officers upon his arrest, he had hidden in a cardboard box in an alley until day light, had been in Reedley, California, Tijuana, Mexico and for the past two years had been living in Guadalupe.

## BOARD FINDINGS

In the matter of Santiago Montenegro, CDC number H-55090. The panel reviewed all the information received from the public and relied on the following circumstances in concluding that the prisoner is not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison.

The offense was carried out in an especially callous manner, and the motive for the offense was very trivial in relation to the offense.

## MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION

The psychological report by Dr. William Gamard, Ph.D is supportive of parole pursuant to Penal Code Section 5079. (see Exhibit 3 at pp.4-6).

### CURRENT DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSIONS:

Axis I: No contributory.

Axis II: No contributory.

Axis III. No contributory.

Axis IV: Incarceration.

Axis V: GAF equals 85.

Should this inmate at this time be given a parole or release date his prognosis for maintaining his present gains in the community is excellent.

### ASSESSMENT OF DANGEROUSNESS:

A. This inmate has not received any CDC-115 violations for violent behavior during his entire incarceration of 16 years. He only had one CDC-115, whis was on March 6, 2002 for refusing to work. Therefore, it is felt that he would pose a less than average risk for violence when compared with this Level Two inmate population.

- 1 B. If released to the community his violence potential is  
 2 estimated to be no higher than the average citizen in  
 3 the community. This based upon the following consider-  
 4 ations: there is no evidence of any previous violent  
 5 behavior, or violent behavior since his offense. There  
 6 was no history of prior arrest other than one DUI. Al-  
 7 though he did flee the scene of the crime, evaded arrest  
 8 for six years, and formerly appeared to lack remorse for  
 9 his crime, he has since accepted full responsibility for  
 10 his offense.

7 CLINICIAN OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 8 A. This inmate is responsible for his behavior. He has the  
 9 ability to abide by institutional standards and has done  
 10 so during his incarceration period.  
 11 B. This inmate has no mental health disorder, which would  
 12 necessitate treatment either during his incarceration  
 13 period or following parole.  
 14 C. Since this inmate denies having any alcohol or drug  
 15 problem, no recommendations are made in this area.

14 IV.


15 EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

16  
 17 Petitioner filed this petition in the superior Court in the first  
 18 instance inasmuch as the Board of Parole Hearings no longer provides  
 19 for administrative appeals.

20 V.

21 VERIFICATION

22 I am the petitioner in this action. All facts in the above doc-  
 23 uments, not otherwise supported by citation to the record, exhibits, of  
 24 other documents, are true of my own personal knowledge. I declare  
 25 under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and  
 26 that this declaration was executed on this date 3-23-07, at the  
 27 Correctional Training Facility at Soledad, California.

28   
 Santiago Montenegro

## VII.

CRITERIA FOR PAROLE

The "unreasonable risk" requirement is the standard required by statute (3041,subd,[b]), and by the Board regulations in order to justify a denial of parole. (CCR 15. 2402,subd [a]), Section 3041,(a), Penal Code requires, in pertinent part:

One year prior to the inmates minimum eligible parole date a panel consisting of at least two commissioners of the Board Of Parole Hearings shall again meet with the inmate and normally set a parole release date as provided in section 3041.5. The release date shall be set in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect to their threat to public.... Subd. [b] of section 3041 provides in pertinent part, that: the panel or board shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration of this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.

TITLE 15, DIVISION 2, BOARD REGULATIONS2402. DETERMINATION OF SUITABILITY.

- (a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison. (emphasis added).
- (b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information available to the panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole. Such information shall include the circumstances of the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the community;

1 and any other information which bears on the prisoner's  
2 suitability for release. Circumstances which taken al-  
3 one may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole  
may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding  
of unsuitability.

4 (c) Circumstances Tending To Show Unsuitability. The follow-  
5 ing circumstances each tend to indicate unsuitability  
6 for release. These circumstances are set forth as guide-  
7 lines; the importance attached to any circumstances or  
combination of circumstances in a particular case is left  
to the judgment of the panel. Circumstances tending to  
indicate unsuitability include:

8 (1) Commitment Offense: The prisoner committed the offense  
9 in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. the  
factors to be considered include:

10 (A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the  
11 same or separate incidents.

12 (B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and cal-  
culated manner such as an execution-style murder.

13 (C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or  
14 after the offense.

15 (D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstra-  
16 tes an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

17 (E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial  
18 in relation to the offense.

19 (2) Previous Record Of Violence. The prisoner on previous  
occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict serious in-  
jury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner demonst-  
rated serious assaultive behavior at an early age.

20 (3) Unsuitable Social History. The prisoner has a history of  
21 unsuitable or tumultuous relationships with others.

22 (4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously  
sexually assaulted another in a manner calculated to  
23 inflict unusual pain or fear upon the victim.

24 (5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history  
of severe mental problems related to the offense.

25 (6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in ser-  
26 ious misconduct in prison or jail.  
27  
28

1 (d) Circumstances Tending To Show Suitability. The following  
2 circumstances each tend to show that the prisoner is su-  
3 itable for release. The circumstances are set forth as  
4 general guidelines; the importance attached to any circ-  
5 umstances or combination of circumstances in a particular  
6 case is left to the judgment of the panel. Circumstances  
7 tending to indicate suitability include:

8 (1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record  
9 assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with  
10 a potential of personal harm to victims.

11 (2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reas-  
12 onably stable relationships with others.

13 (3) Signs Of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend  
14 to indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting  
15 to repair the damage, seeking help for or relieving su-  
16 ffering of the victim, or indicating that he understands  
17 the nature and magnitude of the offense.

18 (4) Motivation For Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as  
19 the result of significant stress in his life, especially  
20 if the stress has built over a long period of time.

21 (5) Battered Woman Syndrome. (Not quoted here as inapplicable).

22 (6) Lack Of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any signif-  
23 icant history of violent crime.

24 (7) Age. The prisoner's present age reduces the probability  
25 of recidivism.

26 (8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made  
27 realistic plans for release or has developed marketable  
28 skills that can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities and en-  
hanced ability to function within the law upon release.

VIII.


PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Santiago Montenegro states that he has no other plain or speedy remedy save habeas corpus: therefore, he prays this Honorable Court:

1. Issue an order to show cause;
2. Appoint counsel to represent petitioner in any and all proceedings in this matter.
3. Conduct an evidentiary hearing;
4. Order respondents to provide petitioner with reasonable discovery;
5. Declare the rights of the petitioner;
6. Grant any other further relief the court deems proper and just.

Date: 3-23-07

Respectfully, submitted

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Santiago Montenegro

## IX.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIESTHE LAW ON PAROLE

Penal Code section 3041, subdivision (a) requires that at a suitability hearing the board "shall normally set a parole release date...Subdivision (b) provides that a release date "shall" be set "unless" the Board determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual...See, e.g., *In re Rosenkrantz*, 29 Cal.App. 4th 616, at 653, (2002), citing to *In re Ramirez*, 94 Cal. App. 4th 549, at 565. The parole board regulations make this criterion more specific. The panel can deny only if the prisoner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison. (Cal. Code Regs., tit 15, 2402, subd (a). The regulations set forth specific criteria to determine whether under the standard a prisoner is suitable for parole.

Under the rule created by the United States Supreme court in *Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal* (1979) 442 U.S. 1,12, and *Board of Pardons v. Allen* (1987) 482 U.S. 369, 377-378, a state's statutory parole scheme which used mandatory language "creates a presumption that parole will be granted" when or unless certain designated findings are made, and therefore gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest. The California parole scheme uses mandatory language which is parallel to the parole scheme found in *Greenholtz* and *Allen*

1 to give rise to a protected liberty interest in parole. Accordingly,  
2 the California parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty in-  
3 terest in release on parole. See also, *McQuillion v. Duncan*, 306 F.3d  
4 895, 902 (9th Cir. Cal.2002); and *Biggs v. Terhune*, 334 F.3d 910  
5 (9th Cir. Cal. 2003), affirming these propositions in California's  
6 section 3041, penal code. Following on the heels of *McQuillion*, supra,  
7 the seminal case of *In re Rosenkrantz* held that the statutory parole  
8 scheme creates a liberty interest under California due process of law.  
9 *Id.*, at 29 Cal. 4th at 668, fn.12. The court then applied the clearly  
10 established federal due process test to review a gubernatorial dec-  
11 ision to deny parole. It recognized that a gubernatorial decision is  
12 subject to judicial review to determine whether there is "some evi-  
13 dence" to support the decision. In this case, the decision by the Board  
14 to find petitioner unsuitable for parole is also subject to review to  
15 determine if there is some evidence to support the decision, the ev-  
16 idence must bear some indicis of reliability, *Cato v. Rushen*, 824 F.  
17 2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. Cal. 1987); also, *Jancsek v. Oregon Board of*  
18 *Parole*, 833 F. 2d 1389, 1390. (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must be  
19 relevant and material to the decision. (Cal. Code Regs., 15. 2000 (b)  
20 (50) Good Cause; (63) Material Evidence, (90) Relevant Evidence (*Ibid.*  
21 (50) Good Cause: A finding by the board based upon a preponderance of  
22 the evidence that there is a factual basis and good reason for the  
23 decision made. Evidence which tends to prove or disprove an issue or  
24 facts in dispute. *In re Caswell*, 92 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1030; *McQuillion*  
25 supra, 306F.3d at 906,910.

26 A. THE DECISION TO FIND PETITIONER UNSUITABLE FOR  
27 PAROLE IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND VIOLATES DUE  
28 PROCESS; PETITIONER MUST BE GRANTED A PAROLE DATE.

1           1. THE DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY RELEVANT OR  
2 MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

3       Proceeding under the presumption that the evidence must be rel-  
4 evant and material, there was no relevant or material evidence to ba-  
5 se denial of parole to petitioner. Under federal due process analysis,  
6 after finding a liberty interest, it must be determined what process  
7 is due. Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471,481. In this context,  
8 the United States Supreme Court has held that there must be "some ev-  
9 idence" Superintendent v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445,456, where it sta-  
10 tes that "the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due process clause  
11 does not require courts to set aside decisions of prison administra-  
12 tors that have some basic fact."

13       Additionally, the evidence underlying the Board's decision must  
14 have some indicia of reliability. Jancsek, supra 833 F. 2d at 1390.  
15 In this case, petitioner contends that the Board of Parole Hearings  
16 erroneously concluded there is some evidence to justify the finding  
17 that he is suitable for parole.

18  
19           (a). THE COMMITMENT OFFENSE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE "SOME  
20 EVIDENCE" FOR DENIAL OF PAROLE IN THIS CASE.

21       In finding petitioner unsuitable for parole the panel stated  
22 that the commitment offense was carried out in an especially vicious  
23 and brutal manner. Additionally, the motive of this crime was inexpl-  
24 icable and trivial in relationship to the offense. Moreover, the off-  
25 ense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates exceptional insen-  
26 sitive disregard for human suffering. Such a finding is contrary to the  
27 facts of the case, where the record indicates petitioner would pose a  
28

1 low degree of risk to society if he were released from prison at this  
2 time. It could be argued that any and all murders are carried out in  
3 a vicious, brutal manner without regard to human suffering. and in  
4 fact is what second degree murder is. But used as a regulation for  
5 unsuitability would have to denote something greater than an ordinary  
6 or typical killing. Nonetheless, as the psychological evaluation re-  
7 port clearly demonstrates, petitioner has made substantial and signif-  
8 icant progress in growth and maturation while incarcerated. The record  
9 is replete with his achieving the correctional objectives of reforming  
10 his life, and it would be a disservice to the professionalism and pro-  
11 grams of the Department to devalue petitioner's officially-recognized  
12 progress and deny him parole because he committed the offense. Despite  
13 this offense, he was sentenced to a parolable sentence. Certainly, his  
14 case falls within the meaning expressed in Ramirez, supra, that any  
15 murder is parolable under the statute. Yet, the panel made no effort  
16 to distinguish his offense as containing circumstances which are be-  
17 yond the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for the crime of  
18 second degree murder.

19  
20 2. THE BOARD'S BOILERPLATE RELIANCE ON STATIC HISTORY  
21 FACTORS VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS.

22 The Ninth Circuit has expressed concern about the use of the  
23 commitment offense to repeatedly deny parole. As the circuit in Biggs  
24 v. Terhune (9th Cir. 2003) 334 F. 3d 910,916, recently acknowledge:  
25 "Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is a process. It is  
26 a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of  
27 judgment by those whom the constitution has entrusted with the unfold-  
28 ing of the process. "Lankford v. Idaho 500 U.S. 110,121 (1991 (quoting

1 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)  
2 (Frankfurter, J., Concurring). A continued reliance in the future on an  
3 unchanging factor, the circumstances of the crime... runs contrary to  
4 the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could re-  
5 sult in a due process violation. See also, In re Rosenkrantz, supra,  
6 29 Cal. 4th at 689 (Moreno, J., concurring). (Emphasis added). Biggs  
7 was denied at his first initial parole hearing. The Circuit allowed  
8 that the commitment offense could be used at that initial hearing as  
9 a legitimate cause for denial of parole, but questioned whether it  
10 could be used as a factor to continue denying parole at subsequent  
11 hearings. At first blush, the use of the offense in the petitioner's  
12 case at his initial hearing might have been upheld as "some evidence".  
13 but the hearing challenged here is his (2nd) subsequent hearing. The  
14 Biggs court gave clear indication that had it been Biggs subsequent  
15 hearing, the court may have found against the Board on using the off-  
16 ense to again base parole denial on.

17 When considering the offense as circumstances for unsuitability  
18 the Board must be and should be mindful that the circumstances of the  
19 offense are static and unchangeable. The most important aspect of this  
20 case is the dynamic changes that years of imprisonment and exposure to  
21 positive, behavioral programs has made in this petitioner. The record  
22 shows that he has achieved the objective of corrections, i.e., to co-  
23 rrect behavior, and the record shows official and professional recog-  
24 nition that he does not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if  
25 paroled. Thus, since there is no evidence whatsoever of unreasonable  
26 risk, which is the standard by which the Board's decision legally hi-  
27 nges, the Board's decision denying petitioner parole must be reversed.  
28 The statutory default must be enforced in this case.

1           3. THE BOARD'S STATEMENT OF REASON WAS INADEQUATE.

2           The Board's statement of reasons were inadequate and inappropri-  
 3           ate. In In re Strum (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 258, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361, 521  
 4           P. 2d 97. The California Supreme Court held that in order to comply  
 5           with a prisoner's due process rights, the Board must "support all its  
 6           denials of parole with a written definitive statement of its reasons  
 7           therefore and to communicate such statements to the inmate concerned".  
 8           (Id., at P. 273.) The Strum court articulated three rationales as to  
 9           why the Board must provide a written statement of reasons granting pa-  
 10          role: (1) to promote careful decision making; (2) to allow inmates to  
 11          make an informed application for relief if parole is denied; and (3)  
 12          to permit meaningful judicial review. (Id., at P. 270.) Other courts  
 13          have taken similar positions where judges have failed to adequately  
 14          articulate their findings. See People v. Martin (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 905,  
 15          913-915, and cases cited. In Martin the court said, citing several ca-  
 16          ses, such as In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal. 3d 921, that

17  
 18                "We emphasized that a requirement of articulated reasons  
 19                to support a given decision serves a number of interests;  
 20                it is frequently essential to meaningful review; it acts  
 21                as an inherent guard against careless decisions, insuring  
 22                that the judge himself analyzes the problem and recognizes  
 23                the grounds for his decision-making process by helping to  
 24                persuade the parties and the public that the decision-mak-  
 25                ing is careful, reasoned and equitable". (Ibid.)

26           Here, the Board's statement of reasons is crptic at best. It  
 27           merely recites the commitment offense as the primary basis upon which  
 28           it denied parole and list pro forma boilerplate terminology from its  
 Parole Denial Worksheet/Fm. 1000A. It dose not explain what it is ab-  
 out the commitment offense and its inclusive aggravvting circumstances  
 that make the petitioner an "unreasonable risk of danger to society if

1 released". (see section 2402, subd. (a).) or how the commitment offe-  
 2 nse was "particularly egergiuous". It did not explain how all the evi-  
 3 dence supporting petitioner's suitability for parole, including all  
 4 the psychological clearances, and lack of any violent criminal history  
 5 did not outweigh under the ordinary rules of the "perponderance of  
 6 evidence" standard employed by the Board's regulations (see section  
 7 2000 (b), (50) - the static history of the commitment offense. There-  
 8 fore, the Board's abused its discretion in violation of procedural due  
 9 process by failing to properly apply its own burden of proof.

10 The Court is not here asked to substitute its judgment for that  
 11 of the Board, nor is it asked to weigh or reweigh the evidence. Rather,  
 12 the court is asked to review de novo the pre-decisional process of the  
 13 hearing, including the evidence submitted, determined the legal sign-  
 14 ificance of that evidence as relevant or irrelevant, and then determine  
 15 if the Board met its own standard of proof in weighing and balancing  
 16 process.

17 **4. THE DECISION TO DENY PETITIONER PAROLE WAS ARBITRARY**  
 18 **AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, UNSUPPORTED BY "SOME EVID-**  
 19 **ENCE, "VIOLATING HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED**  
 20 **BY THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTIT-**  
 21 **UTION OF THE UNITED STATES.**

22 Although the Board of Parole Hearings (hereafter Board) discret-  
 23 ion in parole matters has been described as "broad", it is not absol-  
 24 ute (In re Powell (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 894, 940), as its discretion is  
 25 "cabined" by criteria, in petitioner's case, listed in the California  
 26 Code of Regulations, title 15 § 2402 McQuillion v. Duncan (9th Cir.  
 27 2003) 306 F. 3d 895, 912). Petitioner has not only a liberty interest  
 28 in parole (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 616, 652) but an ex-  
 pectation that [he] will be granted parole unless the Board finds in

1 the exercise of its discretion that [the prisoner is] unsuitable for  
2 parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by the  
3 regulations (Ibid. at 654, emphasis added). Petitioner's liberty inter-  
4 est in and "expectation" of parole, does not attach upon being found  
5 suitable for parole , but upon entrance of prison gates (Biggs v. Ter-  
6 hune (9th Cir. 2003) 334 F. 3d 910,915). A decision of unsuitability  
7 for parole must be supported by some evidence having some indicia of  
8 reliability (Ibid., Citation). There must also be a rational connection  
9 between the evidence and the decision made; if not the decision is ar-  
10 bitrary and an abuse of discretion, violating the due process clause  
11 (Guidotti v. County of Yolo (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 1552,1561; Oregon  
12 Resource Council v. Lowe (9th Cir. 1997) 109 F. 3d 521,526).

13 As will be demonstrated, the decision to deny petitioner parole  
14 for the 2nd time, is not supported by "some evidence" and is therefore  
15 an abuse of discretion, violating his right to due process. (Rosenkran-  
16 tz v. Marshall, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1063. C.C Cal. (2006) U.S. Dist. Lexis  
17 79358; (Martin v. Marshall, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

18 Petitioner's case is exactly what Biggs envision when it stated that  
19 repeated refusals to grant a parole release date to an inmate with an  
20 exemplary post-conviction record may violate the prisoner's due proc-  
21 ess rights Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916. The record in this case is replete  
22 with evidence of petitioner's remorse and rehabilitation, including  
23 glowingly positive psychological reports. (see petitioner's exhibit 3  
24 at pp. 4-6). As detailed above, every psychologist and correctional  
25 counselor who has evaluated petitioner has concluded that petitioner  
26 would pose no significant risk of danger if released. Regardless of  
27 whether the BPH's ever was entitled to rely upon the commitment off-  
28 ense to find that petitioner posed an unreasonable risk of danger and

1 was unsuitable for parole, in the exceptional circumstances presented  
 2 by this case, the BPH's continued reliance on the commitment offense  
 3 violates due process because it resulted in an arbitrary decision and  
 4 because the facts surrounding the offense do not now constitute "some  
 5 evidence" possessing "some indicia of reliability" that petitioner pose  
 6 a danger to the community. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; Biggs, 334 F. at  
 7 917; Irons, 358 F. Supp. 2d at 947; Masoner v. State, 2004 U.S. Dist.  
 8 Lexis 9221, 2004 WL 1080177, at \*1-2 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

### 9 10 ARGUMENTS

#### 11 a. THE COMMITMENT OFFENSE FOR THE SECOND TIME IS NOT 12 "SOME EVIDENCE" UPON WHICH PAROLE CAN BE DENIED.

13 Petitioner's second parole hearing was held on August 16, 2006.  
 14 Presiding Commissioner, James Davis states: This hearing is being co-  
 15 ducted pursuant to Penal Code Section 3041 and 3042 and the rules and  
 16 regulations of the Board of Prison Terms governing parole considera-  
 17 tion hearings for life inmates. (HT 7). In closing the commissioner  
 18 concluded there were Two reasons why this petitioner is not suitable  
 19 for parole and would pose would pose an unreasonable risk to society  
 20 or a threat to public safety if released from prison. (1). The offense  
 21 was carried out in an especially callous manner, and (2). The motive  
 22 for the offense was very trivial in relation to the offense. (HT 33).

23 The relevant evidence does not merely fail to support but re-  
 24 futes the conclusion that the petitioner committed his offense in a  
 25 especially callous maner.  
 26

#### 27 b. THE MANNER IN WHICH PETITIONER COMMITTED HIS OFFENSE 28 DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE AN ESPECIALLY CALLOUS MANNER

1 "[A]ll second degree murders by definition involve some callousness--  
2 i.e., lack of emotion or sympathy, emotional insensitivity, indiffer-  
3 ence to feelings and suffering of others. [Citation.] As noted, how-  
4 ever, parole is the rule, rather than the exception, and a conviction  
5 for second degree murder does not automatically render one unsuitable."  
6 (In re Smith (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 343, 366 [7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655],  
7 italics omitted.) In re Ramirez, supra, 94 Cal. App. 4th 549, as in  
8 this case, the Board denied a parole release date on the basis of a  
9 finding that the nature of the inmates offense displayed a "callous  
10 disregard for human suffering." (Id. at pp. 558, 568.) Setting aside  
11 that determination, the court agreed that "the gravity of the commi-  
12 tment offense or offenses alone may be a sufficient basis for denying  
13 a parole application, so long as the Board does not fail to consider  
14 all other relevant factors," (id. at p. 569), but attached an impor-  
15 tant caveat. As the court explained, "[a]ll violent crime demonstrates  
16 the perpetrator's potential for posing a grave risk to public safety,  
17 yet parole is mandatory for violent felons serving determinate senten-  
18 ces.(Pen. Code, § 3000, subd. (b) (1).

19 Under the Board regulations, base terms for life prisoners are  
20 not calculated until after an inmate is deemed suitable for release.  
21 (§ 2282, subd. (a).) The regulations therefore contemplate that an  
22 inmate may be deemed suitable for release even though his offense  
23 demonstrated "exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering."  
24 (§ 2402, subd. (c) (1) (D).)

25 Because the relevant evidence shows no more callous disregard  
26 for human suffering than is shown by most second degree murder off-  
27 enses, the Board's use of this factor to conclude that petitioner  
28 committed his offense "in an especially cruel and callous manner" was

1 arbitrary and capricious. Examined in light of the record, the Board's  
2 explanation of why petitioner is not suitable for release from prison  
3 is revealed as no more than the mouthing of conclusionary words. The  
4 reliable factual underpinning that is constitutionally required cannot  
5 be shown (see *McQuillion v. Duncan* (9th Cir. 2002) 306 F. 3d 895,902;  
6 *In re Caswell* (2001) 92Cal. App. 4th 1017,1027, [112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 462]  
7 even under the exceptional deferential standard of review.

8 This is petitioner's second suitability hearing in which the  
9 board relied upon unchanging factors to deny petitioner a parole date.  
10 The Ninth Circuit has held that California's parole scheme creates a  
11 cognizable liberty interest in release on parole because Penal Code §  
12 3041 uses mandatory language and is similar to the Nebraska and Montana  
13 statutes addressed in *Greenholtz* and *Allen*, respectively. *McQuillion*,  
14 306 F.3d at 901-902. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "Section 3041  
15 of the California Penal Code creates in every inmate a cognizable lib-  
16 erty interest in parole which is protected by the procedural safeguards  
17 of the Due Process Clause, and that interest arises upon the incarcer-  
18 ation of the inmate. *Biggs v. Terhune*, 334 F.3d 910, 914-915 (9th Cir.  
19 2003). Petitioner has now served 15 years on his sentence, under these  
20 circumstances, the nature of the offense has lost any predictive value  
21 and continued reliance on it to find petitioner unsuitable violated  
22 due process. (*Bair v. Folsom State Prison* 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29952  
23 (E.D. Cal. 2005)). The Biggs Court held, in relevant part:

24 [The] parole board's sole supportable reliance on the  
25 gravity of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment  
26 to justify denial of parole can be initially justified  
27 as fulfilling the requirements set forth by the state.  
28 Over time, however, should Biggs continue to demonstrate  
exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying  
him a parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs  
offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions


1 involving his liberty interest in parole. A continued re-  
2 liance in the future on unchanging factor, the circumstances  
3 of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment runs con-  
4 trary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison sys-  
5 tem. (Biggs v. Terhune, supra, 334 F.3d at 916-917).

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CONCLUSION

When the court applies the some evidence standard as properly understood to the circumstances of Santiago Montenegro, the court will find that the Board's decision was not based on some relevant reliable evidence that reasonably suggest that he poses a current, unreasonable threat to public safety. For these reasons, the petitioner respectfully request that this court vacate the Board's determination of unsuitability and direct the Board to set a parole date for the Petitioner.

Date: 3-23-07

  
Santiago Montenegro


DECLARATION OF SANTIAGO MONTENEGRO

I declare as follows:

I am the petitioner in this case. I am over the age of eighteen years. I am a party to the attached action. I am a resident of the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California. My address is Post Office Box 705/ND-12-L / CTF North Facility / Soledad, California. 93960-0705. I served the attached document entitled "Writ Of Habeas Corpus" on the persons/parties specified below by placing a true copy of said document into a sealed envelope with the appropriate postage affixed thereto and surrendering said envelope to the following:

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
300 South SPRING STREET  
LOS ANGELES, CA. 90013

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 23 day of March, 2007 at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad, California.

  
Declarant

# EXHIBIT 1

SUBSEQUENT PAROLE CONSIDERATION HEARING

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS

In the matter of the Life )  
Term Parole Consideration )  
Hearing of: )

CDC Number H-55090

SANTIAGO MONTENEGRO )  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

CORRECTIONAL TRAINING FACILITY

SOLEDAD, CALIFORNIA

AUGUST 16, 2006

PANEL PRESENT:

JAMES DAVIS, Presiding Commissioner  
NOREEN BLONIEN, Deputy Commissioner

OTHERS PRESENT:

SANTIAGO MONTENEGRO, Inmate  
PATRICK SPARKS, Attorney for Inmate  
LYNN CUTLER, Prosecutor  
JOSE ZAVALA, Spanish Interpreter  
ED MARTINEZ, Commissioner/Observer  
Two Correctional Officers, Unidentified

**INMATE  
COPY**

CORRECTIONS TO THE DECISION HAVE BEEN MADE

\_\_\_\_ No  
\_\_\_\_ Yes

See Review of Hearing  
Transcript Memorandum

Don Larson -- Vine, McKinnon & Hall

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--oOo--

P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2       **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** This is a Subsequent  
3 Parole Consideration Hearing for Santiago Montenegro,  
4 CDC number H-55090. And before we get started, we do  
5 have an interpreter with us today, so I will go ahead  
6 and swear you in, sir. Raise your right hand, do you  
7 solemnly swear to translate from English to Spanish and  
8 from Spanish to English to the best of your ability  
9 accurately?

10       **INTERPRETER ZAVALA:** I do.

11       **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** Thank you. Today's  
12 date is August 16th, 2006. We're located at the  
13 Correctional Training Facility in Soledad. The inmate  
14 was received on November 6th, 1992, from Santa Barbara  
15 County, the life term beginning on January 23rd, 1993,  
16 with a minimum eligible parole date of January 24th,  
17 2003. The controlling offense for which the inmate has  
18 been committed is murder second with a weapon, case  
19 number SN073860 -- 867, excuse me, better repeat that,  
20 SN073867 -- count 1, Penal Code Section 187 second slash  
21 12022.5 paren (a). The inmate received a term of 15  
22 years to life plus two. This hearing is being tape  
23 recorded, and for the purposes of voice identification,  
24 we will each state our first and last name, spelling the  
25 last name, and when it reaches you, Mr. Montenegro, if  
26 you also will give us your CDC number, please, sir. So  
27 I will start and move to my left, I'm James Davis,

1 D-A-V-I-S, Commissioner.

2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BLONIEN: I'm Noreen Blonien,  
3 B-L-O-N-I-E-N. I'm a Deputy Commissioner.

4 ATTORNEY CUTLER: I'm Lynn Cutler, C-U-T-L-E-R. I'm  
5 the prosecutor.

6 ATTORNEY SPARKS: Patrick Sparks, S-P-A-R-K-S,  
7 attorney for Mr. Montenegro.

8 INMATE MONTENEGRO: Santiago Montenegro, S, S, S ...

9 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Just your last name  
10 for spelling.

11 INMATE MONTENEGRO: Montenegro, M-O-N-T-E-N-E-G-R-O,  
12 H-5590 (verbatim).

13 INTERPRETER ZAVALA: Jose Zavala, Z-A-V-A-L-A,  
14 Spanish interpreter.

15 COMMISSIONER MARTINEZ: Ed Martinez, M-A-R-T-I-N-E-Z  
16 Commissioner/Observer.

17 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: We want the record  
18 also to reflect we're joined by two correctional  
19 officers here today, who will not be joining us, for  
20 security purposes only, and will not be actively  
21 participating in this hearing. Mr. Zavala, if you will  
22 read this Americans with Disabilities Act statement,  
23 please, in Spanish.

24 INTERPRETER ZAVALA: [ADA statement read in  
25 Spanish.]

26 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: According to our  
27 records, on February 14th, 2006, together with staff in

1 the institution, you reviewed and signed a BPT Form  
2 1073, indicating that you do not have any disabilities  
3 that would qualify under the Americans with Disabilities  
4 Act; however, you do need a Spanish interpreter, which  
5 of course, is why Mr. Zavala is here today. Has  
6 anything changed since that time, sir?

7 INMATE MONTENEGRO THROUGH INTERPRETER: No.

8 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right, very well.  
9 And did you have an interpreter with you when you  
10 reviewed your C-File?

11 INMATE MONTENEGRO THROUGH INTERPRETER: Yes.

12 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right. And for  
13 the psychological examination, which you took in 2002?

14 INMATE MONTENEGRO THROUGH INTERPRETER: Yes.

15 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right, very well.  
16 You're able to hear us all right?

17 INMATE MONTENEGRO THROUGH INTERPRETER: Yes.

18 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And you made it here  
19 today under your own power? You're able to walk here?

20 INMATE MONTENEGRO THROUGH INTERPRETER: Yes.

21 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right. Is there  
22 any reason that you can think of why you would not be  
23 able to actively participate in this hearing today?

24 INMATE MONTENEGRO THROUGH INTERPRETER: Excuse me?

25 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Is there any  
26 reason -- anything that you can think of that would  
27 preclude you from actively participating in this hearing

1 today?

2 INMATE MONTENEGRO THROUGH INTERPRETER: No.

3 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right, very well.

4 Counsel, you're satisfied with that as well?

5 ATTORNEY SPARKS: Yes.

6 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right. Thank  
7 you. This hearing is being conducted pursuant to Penal  
8 Code sections 3041 and 3042 and the rules and  
9 regulations of the Board of Prison Terms governing  
10 parole consideration hearings for life inmates. The  
11 purpose of today's hearing is to once again consider the  
12 number and nature of the crimes for which you were  
13 committed, your prior criminal and social history, and  
14 your behavior and programming since your commitment.  
15 We've had the opportunity today to review your Central  
16 File and your prior transcript, and you will be given  
17 the opportunity to clarify the record as we proceed. We  
18 will reach a decision today and inform you of whether or  
19 not we find you suitable for parole and the reasons for  
20 our decision. If you are found suitable for parole, the  
21 length of your confinement will be explained to you.  
22 Nothing that happens here today will change the findings  
23 of the court. The Panel is not here to retry your case,  
24 the Panel is here for the sole purpose of determining  
25 your suitability for parole. Do you understand that,  
26 sir?

27 INMATE MONTENEGRO THROUGH INTERPRETER: Yes.

1           **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** Thank you. This  
2       hearing will be conducted in basically two phases, first  
3       I will discuss with you the crime for which you were  
4       committed, as well as your prior criminal and social  
5       history; and Commissioner Blonien will then discuss with  
6       you your progress since your commitment, your  
7       counselor's report, psychological evaluation, parole  
8       plans, and any literature of support or opposition as  
9       they may exist. Once that is concluded, the  
10      prisoners -- the Commissioners, excuse me -- and the  
11      District Attorney, and your attorney will have an  
12      opportunity to ask you questions. Questions that come  
13      from the District Attorney will be asked through the  
14      Chair, and you will respond back to the Panel with your  
15      response. Next, the District Attorney and then your  
16      attorney will be given an opportunity to make a final  
17      closing statement and then followed by your closing  
18      statement. Your closing statement should focus on your  
19      suitability for parole. The California Code of  
20      Regulations states that regardless of time served, an  
21      inmate shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole  
22      if, in the judgment of the Panel, the inmate would pose  
23      an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released  
24      from prison. And now you have certain rights, those  
25      rights include the right to a timely notice of this  
26      hearing, the right to review your Central File, and the  
27      right to present relevant documents. Counsel, are you

1 satisfied your client's rights have been met to date?

2 **ATTORNEY SPARKS:** Yes.

3 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** Thank you. You have  
4 an additional right, and that is to be heard by an  
5 impartial panel. Now you've heard your panel introduce  
6 themselves this morning, is there any reason for you to  
7 believe that we would not be impartial?

8 **INMATE MONTENEGRO THROUGH INTERPRETER:** (Inaudible).

9 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** Thank you. You will  
10 receive a written copy of our tentative decision today.  
11 That decision becomes effective in 120 days. A copy of  
12 the decision and a copy of the transcript will be sent  
13 to you. The Panel -- the Board -- has eliminated its  
14 appeal process; if you disagree with anything in today's  
15 hearing, you have the right to go directly to court with  
16 your complaint. You are not required to admit your  
17 offense or discuss your offense; however, once again,  
18 the Panel does accept the findings of the court to be  
19 true. Do you understand that, sir?

20 **INMATE MONTENEGRO THROUGH INTERPRETER:** Yes.

21 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** Okay. Commissioner,  
22 are we going to be dealing with anything from a  
23 confidential file today?

24 **DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BLONIEN:** There's no  
25 confidential information.

26 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** All right. Then I'm  
27 going to pass a checklist and documents to both counsel,

1 if you'll take a look at that to make sure we're all  
2 operating off the same list of documents. The  
3 prosecution, do you have those documents as well?

4 **ATTORNEY CUTLER:** Yes.

5 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** All right. Then  
6 we'll mark that Exhibit 1. Counsel, anything additional  
7 you would like us to consider today?

8 **ATTORNEY SPARKS:** No, thank you.

9 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** All right. Any  
10 preliminary objections?

11 **ATTORNEY SPARKS:** No.

12 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** All right. Will your  
13 client be speaking with us today?

14 **ATTORNEY SPARKS:** Yes, but he won't be talking about  
15 the crime.

16 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** All right. If there  
17 are no other matters -- if you'll raise your right hand.  
18 Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you  
19 will give at this hearing will be the truth and nothing  
20 but the truth?

21 **INMATE MONTENEGRO:** Yes.

22 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** All right, thank you.  
23 For a summary of the crime, I'm going to refer to the  
24 probation officer's report starting on page 2 under the  
25 heading of offense. It starts on the first paragraph,  
26 where it states that:

27 "On November 13th, 1985, Santa Maria police

1 officers responded to El Conquistador Bar at  
2 210 South Bloosser, B-L-O-O-S-S-E-R,  
3 Santa Maria, to investigate a shooting.  
4 Officers found Antonio Hernandez Cardona,  
5 C-A-R-D-O-N-A, age 22, slumped in the right  
6 front passenger's seat of an automobile.  
7 Officers observed a gunshot wound into the  
8 front of his neck. An ambulance was called and  
9 he was taken to Maria Medical Center, where he  
10 died at 2315 hours. Doctors concluded the  
11 victim died as a result of a gunshot wound to  
12 the anterior neck slash chest, exiting through  
13 the back. A second entry wound in the left  
14 shoulder revealed a .44 caliber bullet. The  
15 victim was shot three times. Investigations  
16 revealed the victim was the alleged boyfriend  
17 of Lilliana Beltran, B-E-L-T-R-A-N, and they  
18 had been inside the El Conquistador Bar.  
19 Ms. Beltran left the bar and went outside to  
20 the victim's car. The defendant followed  
21 Ms. Beltran out to the car, sat down in the  
22 car, and tried to kiss her. The victim came  
23 out of the bar with two friends, saw what was  
24 going on, and pulled the defendant out of the  
25 car. The victim and defendant verbally argued.  
26 The defendant pulled a .44 Magnum pistol from  
27 his waistband and fired three or four shots

1 into the victim. The defendant fled the area.  
2 The defendant told officers upon his arrest he  
3 had hidden in a cardboard box in an alley until  
4 daylight, had been in Reedley, California, and  
5 had gone on to Mexico, and for the past three  
6 years had been living in Guadalupe."

7 Under prisoner's version, as listed in the June 2002  
8 Board Report, it states that in an interview for the  
9 Montenegro -- an interview for this report, Montenegro  
10 indicated that his previous interview with staff  
11 psychiatrist Cheema, C-H-E-E-M-A, on 1/16/96, he  
12 indicated that his present version remained the same.  
13 Montenegro stated that he was involved in a fight with  
14 an unknown --

15 **DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BLONIEN:** Just a question.  
16 Mr. Sparks, you're aware that in the '02 psych report  
17 there's a different version.

18 **ATTORNEY SPARKS:** Well, there's probably three  
19 versions total.

20 **DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BLONIEN:** Right.

21 **ATTORNEY SPARKS:** So, I'm not sure which one you  
22 want to refer to ...

23 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** Well, we're going to  
24 refer to all the ones that we have, actually, so we'll  
25 have this and plus --

26 **DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BLONIEN:** They're very --

27 **PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS:** -- we have the psych

1 that we're going to --

2 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BLONIEN: They're very  
3 conflicting, and I don't know if he understood when he  
4 talked to his counselor and referred to the psych  
5 report, he really meant the '96 psych report where he  
6 said he had no responsibility, or the '02 psych report  
7 where he took full responsibility. And so since this is  
8 only his first hearing, for Subsequent Hearing, I know  
9 you want the record clear.

10 ATTORNEY SPARKS: His statement to me was that he  
11 shot the victim.

12 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BLONIEN: So that's in the '02  
13 psych report. I believe in the '96 psych report he said  
14 he did not.

15 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Why don't we do this,  
16 we'll go ahead and go through this part of this, that  
17 will give us at least a chronology for now, and when we  
18 get to this part of it, and then when we get to the  
19 psych report, we'll cover that as well.

20 DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BLONIEN: Okay.

21 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: So we'll have  
22 (inaudible). Is there a third?

23 ATTORNEY SPARKS: Maybe, but not right now.

24 PRESIDING COMMISSIONER DAVIS: All right. So we'll  
25 have at least everything on the record for this time,  
26 and then we'll get it from there.

27 ATTORNEY SPARKS: Okay.